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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
VALIDITY OF ATTORNEY FEE CAPS IN INDIGENT CASES:
MISSISSIPPI'S CHALLENGE
I. INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment guarantees that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy ...

the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 1 The 1963

case of Gideon v. Wainwright 2 held that this guarantee was applicable and obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment. 3 The states responded to this mandate by legislatively enacting statutes to ensure that each indigent
defendant was represented by counsel. Compensation for appointed counsel
was also provided by statute. 4
Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 99-15-17, entitled "Compensation of
Counsel-Amount," provides that maximum compensation is $1,000, unless
the case is capital and two attorneys are appointed; then the maximum compensation is $2,000. The statute also provides for reimbursement of actual expenses. 5

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Since that time the guarantee of counsel in criminal cases has been extended to include: juvenile
proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); persons charged with misdemeanors, Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972); and civil actions, State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985).
4. In Kansas, for example, three methods were established:
(I) Public defender systems in certain counties;
(2) Panel systems in which attorney participation is voluntary; and
(3) Panel systems in which attorney participation is mandatory.
State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 349, 747 P.2d 816, 845 (1987). Mississippi's appointment
statute is § 99-15-15. It reads as follows:
When any person shall be charged with a felony, misdemeanor punishable by confinement for ninety
(90) days or more, or commission of an act of delinquency, the court or the judge in vacation, being
satisfied that such person is an indigent person and is unable to employ counsel, may, in the discretion of the court, appoint counsel to defend him.
Such appointed counsel shall have free access to the accused who shall have process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his favor.
The accused shall have such representation available at every critical stage of the proceeding against
him where a substantial right may be affected.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-15-15 (1973).
5. § 99-15-17 reads as follows:
The compensation for counsel for indigents appointed as provided in section 99-15-15, shall be
approved and allowed by the appropriate judge in any one (1)case may not exceed one thousand
dollars ($1,000.00) for representation in circuit court whether on appeal or originating in said court.
Provided, however, if said case is not appealed to or does not originate in a court of record, the
maximum compensation shall not exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) for any one (1)case, the
amount of such compensation to be approved by a judge of the chancery court, county court or circuit court in the county where the case arises. Provided, however, in a capital case two (2) attorneys
may be appointed, and the compensation may not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per case.
If the case is appealed to the state supreme court by counsel appointed by the judge, the allowable
fee for services on appeal shall not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per case. In addition,
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The constitutionality of this statute is currently being challenged by the attorneys in the case of Marion Albert Pruett v. State of Mississippi.6
II. BACKGROUND

On September 17, 1981, an employee of Unifirst Savings & Loan Association in Jackson, Mississippi, Peggy Lowe, was taken hostage during the commission of an armed robbery. I She was taken into the State of Alabama and
killed. 8 The perpetrator of this crime was Marion Albert Pruett, the selfconfessed "mad dog killer." Pruett has undergone two trials in Mississippi for
the capital murder of Peggy Lowe. His alleged crime, his capture, and all aspects
of his trek through the judicial system have received extensive publicity throughout the state. 9
The current appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case comes from
Mr. Pruett's second set of attorneys who conducted his second trial, Stephen
B. Bright and Palmer Singleton of Atlanta, Georgia. 10 The defense of Mr.
Pruett's capital charge included extensive motion practice, investigation, research,
and writing. 11 Counsel expended $3,250 of their own funds to engage an expert on the issue of post-hypnotic testimony. 12 There were two interlocutory
appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court prior to trial. 13 The trial lasted from
January 25, 1988, to February 25, 1988. 1 Excluding expenses for travel, lodging, meals, and long distance telephone calls, 15 Mr. Bright spent 449.5
hours 16 and Mr. Singleton spent 482.5 hours 17 defending Mr. Pruett. The trial
court awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,000 each for a total of
$2,000.18 Calculating this sum into an hourly figure, Mr. Bright received $2.22
per hour for his services; Mr. Singleton received $2.07 per hour for his servthe judge shall allow reimbursement of actual expenses. The attorney or attorneys so appointed shall
itemize the time spent in defending said indigents together with an itemized statement of expenses
of such defense, and shall present the same to the appropriate judge. The fees and expenses as allowed by the appropriate judge shall be paid by the county treasurer out of the general fund of the
county in which the prosecution was commenced.
6. Motion for Permission to Appeal and for Full Briefing and Oral Argument on Denial of Motion
for Adequate Compensation of Counsel, Pruett v. State, 431 So. 2d 1101 (Miss. 1983) (No. DP-27) [hereinafter Motion].
7. Pruett v. State, 431 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Miss. 1983).
8. Id.
9. For the extent of press coverage, see Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So. 2d 1163
(Miss. 1987).
10. Motion, supra note 6, at 1-2, 11.
11.

Id. at4.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

6.
3.
4.
6.
Exhibit B.

at 6.
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ices. Reimbursement for the cost of the expert was denied. 19
Mr. Bright and Mr. Singleton petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for
permission to appeal the trial court's ruling on adequate compensation. Permission was granted October 5, 1988. 20 The issue presented by the petition is
"whether the statutory limit of $1,000 for compensation of a court-appointed
attorney may divest the courts of the authority to authorize a reasonable fee
in a highly complex, time consuming capital case, even if the attorney is paid
less than federal minimum wage as a result?" 21 The issue as certified by the
trial court is "[that a] substantial basis exists for a difference of legal opinion
on the question of the constitutionality of Mississippi Code Annotated Section
99-15-17 as applied to this case, and that this issue is of general importance
to the administration of justice." 2 2
The following discussion clearly shows that the court does have the authority
to approve and authorize a reasonable fee in this case. Further, while the statute in question itself may be constitutional, the application of the statute by
the trial court was unconstitutional.
III.

RESPONSE OF OTHER STATES

The idea that attorneys should render services at lower rates, or even for free,
is not new; it is a concept that has prevailed for centuries. 23 However, when
this concept is utilized as a rationale for establishing maximum amounts for
attorney fees in court appointments, with the result that an attorney is deprived
of adequate compensation, then the statute's application has reached constitutional proportions and must be addressed. Constitutional challenges to maximum fees for court-appointed counsel are beginning to surface around the nation,
and in four states the challenges have been successful. 24 Now, Mississippi has
an opportunity to set precedent within her boundaries and to follow an emerging trend.
Each case or statute must stand or fall based on the individual facts surrounding
the challenge. Hopefully, the Mississippi Supreme Court will analyze the cases
discussed below in reaching a decision in Pruett. The cases that follow will
be discussed at length so that the reader will be able to understand fully all the
arguments made and their ultimate application to the Pruett challenge.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Pruett v. State, 431 So. 2d 1101 (Miss. 1983), appeal docketed, No. DP-27 (Miss. 1988).
Motion, supra note 6, at 1.
Motion, supra note 6, at 2.

23. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyers Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 735 (1980).

24. Alaska, DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); Florida, Makemson v. Martin
County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986); Kansas, State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816
(1987); and New Hampshire, State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 465 A.2d 1214 (1983). An excellent reference for the ethical issues involved in providing pro bono representation are presented in Shapiro, supra
note 23.
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A. New Hampshire
New Hampshire addressed the issue of attorney fees and expenses in the 1983
case of State v. Robinson 25 and found that courts do have the authority to exceed statutory maximums for attorneys' fees for "good cause." The indigent
in that case was charged with a misdemeanor. However, the rationale is equally
applicable to felony charges.
New Hampshire's compensation schedule for court-appointed attorneys in effect
during the time at question in Robinson was Superior Court Rule 104. 26 This
schedule provided the following: out-of-court preparation, $20 an hour, with
a maximum of $25 an hour; in court, $30, with a maximum of $35 an hour,
$200 maximum per day. 27 Effective May 1, 1981, Rule 104 was amended by
supreme court order and "provided that the $500 maximum fee for misdemeanor
cases 'shall not be exceeded.' 28 Rule 104 also provided for compensation for
"investigative, expert, or other necessary services" upon the court's "finding
29
of necessity and reasonableness."
Counsel submitted a statement for $1,265 in attorney's fees, based on the minimum hourly rates provided, and expenses of $429.38, for a total of
$1,694.38.30 The trial court entered an award of $500, the maximum provided by the rule. Counsel appealed on two grounds: (1) that the maximum limit
of $500 was arbitrary and, as such, denied the defendant effective assistance
of counsel; and (2) that the maximum limit of $500 violated his right of due
process and equal protection. The constitutionality of the rule itself was not
challenged.
Addressing the fee limit, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:
A fee for the defense of an indigent criminal defendant need not be equal to
that which an attorney would expect to receive from a paying client, but should
strike a balance between conflicting interests which include the ethical obligation
of a lawyer to make legal representation available, and the increasing burden on
the legal profession to provide counsel to indigents. 31
Concerned that the limit on attorney's fees could "result in unfairness and unreasonableness" 32 and in an effort to "adequately protect both the indigent defense
fund and the right of an accused citizen to effective assistance of legal counsel," 33 the court then amended Supreme Court Rule 47 34 to include the lan25. 123 N.H. 665,
26. Id. at 667, 465
in June, 1982. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 667, 465
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See supra note

465 A.2d 1214 (1983).
A.2d at 1215. Superior Court Rule 104 was replaced by Supreme Court Rule 47

A.2d at 1216.

26.
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guage of Rule 104: "'for good cause shown in exceptional circumstances"' the
maximum [for misdemeanors] "'may be exceeded with the approval of the trial
justice.' 35
In addressing the issue of reimbursement of expenses, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire held that serious due process issues would be raised if lawyers, in a class separate from all other citizens, were required to pay criminal
defense expenses. 36 Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that the failure
of the trial court to reimburse counsel in this case constituted "a taking of7 his
financial resources which violates the State and Federal Constitutions." 3
The case was remanded for a determination of whether the expenses incurred
were reasonable and "whether the $500 maximum fee should be exceeded for
'good cause.'" 38
B. Florida
The challenge to Florida's maximum attorney fee statute came in July of 1986
in Makemson v. Martin County. 3' This was the first case to hold that maximum fee limitation could be unconstitutional as applied, although the statute
itself was constitutional. The challenged statute, Section 925-036, provided for
compensation to be fixed by the chief senior judge based upon an hourly rate,
not to exceed the hourly rate charged by other attorneys nor the maximums
of the statutes: $1,000 for misdemeanors and juvenile cases; $2,500 for noncapital, non-life felonies; $3,000 for life felonies; $3,500 for capital cases; and
$2,000 on appeal. 40
35. 123 N.H. at 668-69, 465 A.2d at 1216.
36. State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. at 669 (citing Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th
Cir. 1982)).
37. Specifically, N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 2 and 12, U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. Id.
38. Id.
39. 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986).
40. Id. at 1111-12. The statute reads:
(1) An attorney appointed pursuant to s. 925.035 or s. 27.53 shall, at the conclusion of the representation, be compensated at an hourly rate fixed by the chief judge or senior judge of the circuit in
an amount not to exceed the prevailing hourly rate for similar representation rendered in the circuit;
however, such compensation shall not exceed the maximum fee limits established by this section.
In addition, such attorney shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred, including the costs
of transcripts authorized by the court. If the attorney is representing a defendant charged with more
than one offense in the same case, the attorney shall be compensated at the rate provided for the
most serious offense for which he represented the defendant. This section does not allow stacking
of the fee limits established by this section.
(2) The compensation for representation shall not exceed the following:
(a) For misdemeanors and juveniles represented at the trial level: $1,000.
(b) For noncapital, nonlife felonies represented at the trial level: $2,500.
(c) For life felonies represented at the trial level: $3,000.
(d) For capital cases represented at the trial level: $3,500.
(e) For representation on appeal: $2,000.
FLA. STAT. § 925.036 (1981).
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Makemson was an attorney appointed to represent a defendant charged with
first-degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery involving a prominent local
L-;J-.
41 The re
Ias1-ted
nine months an incd.ed
aa 1n "II.I
fI
Il,%,
.n.....
11
.
. .. I- - -I
.II
u
%.I
which necessitated sixty-four hours spent at trial 150 miles from his
home. 42 Makemson spent a total of 248.3 hours on the case. 41 Based on an
hourly rate provided by the circuit's chief judge, Makemson asked for and
received $9,500 in fees, although he had introduced expert testimony valuing
his services at $25,000.44 The maximum allowed by statute was $3,500.
Makemson placed the balance of $6,000 into escrow while the issue of his compensation was appealed.
The trial court found the maximum fee schedule to be impractical and, in
addition, violative of the due process clauses of both the United States and Florida
Constitutions. 46 Additionally, the trial court held the "statute unconstitutional
47
as an impermissible legislative intrusion upon an inherent judicial function."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Florida quashed the trial court's
findings and certified four questions to the Florida Supreme Court, three of
which are pertinent to this comment:
(1) Whether the statute was "unconstitutional on its face as an interference with
the inherent authority of the court to enter such orders as are necessary to carry
out its constitutional authority?"
(2) If the answer to issue number one is no, "could the statute be held unconstitutional as applied to exceptional circumstances or does the trial court have
the inherent authority, in the alternative, to award a greater fee for trial and appeal than the statutory maximum in the extraordinary case?"
(3)If the answer to issue number two is yes, "should the trial court have awarded
an attorney's fee above the statutory maximurn for proceedings at the trial level,
48
given the facts presented to it by trial counsel by his petition and testimony?"
The Supreme Court of Florida found the statute to be constitutional on its
face as a proper exercise of the legislative power "to appropriate funds for public purposes and resolve questions of compensation." 49 However, the court also
found that the inflexibility of the statute interfered "with the defendant's sixth
amendment right 'to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.' 50o As such,
the statute provided only "token compensation" which called into question the
effectiveness of counsel. 51 The court further found that courts have "inherent
41.

Id. at 1110-11.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id.

Id.

51. Id.
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power to ensure the adequate representation of the criminally accused" and that,
when this power is encroached by a statute as applied, the statute is unconstitutional. 52
Affirming the holding in Rose v. Palm Beach County 53 the court reiterated
"the proposition that 'the courts have authority to do things that are absolutely
essential to the performance of their judicial functions.'" s Ensuring competent counsel for indigent defendants within the meaning of the sixth amendment falls within the category of "absolutely essential" functions of the court.
One method of ensuring competent counsel is to provide adequate payment,
for "the link between compensation and the quality of representation remains
too clear." 55 However, in order to depart from the statute, the trial court must
find that the case was extraordinary and unusual "to ensure that an attorney . . . is
not compensated in an amount which is confiscatory of his or her time, energy,
and talents." The determination of extraordinary or unusual circumstances is
best made by the trial judge for they are the ones who "know best those instances in which justice requires departure from the statutory guidelines." 56
Finding that "[t]oken compensation is no longer an alternative" in determining remuneration for court-appointed counsel, 11 the Supreme Court of Florida found the trial court acted within its authority in ensuring adequate
representation for the defendant; quashed the ruling of the Fourth District, thereby reinstating the ruling of the trial court regarding attorneys' fees; and held
that the statute was "directory rather than mandatory." 58
Less than a year later, the question of a trial court departing from the statutory guidelines to award fees in excess of the maximum was once again before
the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Lyons v. Metropolitan Dade
County. 59 Under the authority of Makemson the court upheld the trial court's
determination which awarded reasonable compensation in excess of the statutory maximum. 60
C. Alaska
Can an attorney be compelled to represent an indigent criminal defendant
without compensation? This was the question presented in DeLisio v. Alaska
Superior Court. 61 The answer, at least in Alaska, is "no."
52. Id.
53. 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
54. 491 So. 2d at 1113.

55. Id. at 1114.
56. Id.at 1115.
57. Id.at 1113.
58. Id. at 1115.

59. 507 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987).
60. Id.at 590.
61. 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987).
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Stephen DeLisio was appointed to represent an indigent who had been charged
with sexual abuse of a minor. 62 DeLisio refused the appointment on the grounds
that he was incompetent. Following a hearing regarding his refusal, he was
ordered to commence representation by a date certain or go to jail for contempt. DeLisio persisted in his refusal and another attorney was appointed. The
Supreme Court of Alaska stayed the contempt citation pending a reconsideration motion. The contempt citation was affirmed on reconsideration and DeLisio
appealed. 63
The first issue on appeal was DeLisio's competence to serve as a criminal
attorney. The Alaska Supreme Court summarily rejected the incompetency argument because DeLisio was an active member of the Alaska criminal bar.
The second issue on appeal, however, was upheld. DeLisio claimed that compulsory representation constituted a taking of private property for public use
in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 18, of the Alaska Constitution. 64 Previous rulings
of the Supreme Court of Alaska established that broader protection was conferred under the Alaska Constitution than the United States Constitution regarding
takings. 65 For this reason the federal constitutional claims were not considered. 66 This decision specifically overruled the long-standing case of Jackson v. State6 7 which provided: "[An attorney appointed to represent an indigent
prisoner in a criminal matter has no constitutional right to receive compensation for his services. He has a right to compensation only to the extent that
a statute or court rule may so provide." 8 Thus, Alaska is no longer to be counted
with the jurisdictions holding there is no unconstitutional taking of property
without just compensation when an attorney is required to serve without receiving
payment. 69
What made DeLisio different from Jackson? The Supreme Court of Alaska
concluded that the Alaska Constitution did not exclude attorney services as provided, that, in fact, such a conclusion would be manifestly unreasona62. Id. at 438.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 439. Article 1, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution provides: -Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Id. at 439 n.3.
65. State v. Doyle, 735 P.2d 733, 736 (Alaska 1987); State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 823-24 (Alaska
1976).
66. 740 P.2d at 439 n.3.
67. 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966).
68. Id. at 490.
69. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982). See also 740 P.2d at 445 n.4
(Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting) listing the following jurisdictions which, as of July 21, 1987, recognized the
rule that assigned counsel has no right to compensation "by the public in the absence of a statute or court
rule." Noted parenthetically are the years in which this rule was recognized:
Alabama (1873), Alaska (1966), Arkansas (1876), California (1860), Florida (1972), Georgia (1873), Illinois (1857), Kansas (1868), Kentucky (1946), Louisiana (1891), Michigan (1850),
Mississippi (1881), Missouri (1869), Montana (1874), Nevada (1879), New Jersey (1961),
New York (1879), North Carolina (1967), Pennsylvania (1879), Tennessee (1871), Utah (1911),
Washington (1892), West Virginia (1900).
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ble, 70 particularly in light of the fact that "[liabor is property." 71 Additionally,
the court adopted the idea that an attorney's "professional services are no more
at the mercy of the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods of the merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic" 72 and declared
that an "attorney's services are 'property' within the meaning of Article I, Section 18" of the Constitution of Alaska. 71
The court relied on the analysis of the Supreme Court of Missouri in the case
of State ex rel. Scott v. Roper 74 in rejecting the argument that attorneys are
required to provide free service on demand as officers of the court. 7" Although
Roper involved civil appointments, the court reasoned that the analysis pertained
to criminal appointments as well. 76
The argument that there is a traditional professional obligation on the part
of attorneys to provide gratuitous services was also discounted. As authority
to reject this contention, the court pointed to the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, which merely encourage pro bono service, but do not require
it. 77
Another rejected argument which had previously been held valid was that
the issuance of a license to practice law "carries with it certain conditions, one
of which is the obligation to represent indigent criminal defendants gratuitously." 7 8 In holding that such a construction "would in itself be an impermissible
infringement of Alaska's due process clause," 79 the court agreed with the
Supreme Court of Utah:
While the right of personal liberty and the right to earn a livelihood in any lawful
calling are subject to the licensing power of the state, a state cannot impose restrictions on the acceptance of the license which will deprive the licensee of his
constitutional rights. If states have the power to impose the duty to render gratuitous services on the license of an attorney, that power must be based on more
than the mere right of the state to license..8
The final argument advanced in favor of requiring compulsory representation without compensation was that of a general duty owed to the state by all
citizens equally. This argument was rejected because "[t]he service appropriated in the present action . . . is not one which may be provided by the citizen70. 740 P.2d at 440.
71. Id. (quoting Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 303, 76 P. 848. 850 (Kansas
1904)).
72. Id. at 440-41 (citing Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 17 (1854), (quoted in State ex rel. Scott v. Roper,
688 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Mo. 1985)).
73. Id.at 441.
74. 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985).
75. 740 P.2d at 441.
76. id. at 441 n.7.
77. Id. at 441-42.
78. Id. at 442.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133 P.2d 325, 327 (1943)).
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ry in general, but only by a specifically identifiable class of persons."8,
Having decided that attorney services were property within the meaning of
the Alaska Constitution and, therefore, could not be taken without just compensation, the court turned to the question of how to determine what "just compensation" is. Drawing from other areas in the law wherein "just compensation
is measured by the fair market value of the property appropriated," 82 the court
held that remuneration for attorney services should be calculated in accordance
with market value. The court reasoned, however, that this computation would
only "reflect the compensation received by the average competent attorney operating on the open market" and not "reflect any specific attorney's normal rate
83
of compensation."
D. Kansas
The most extensive opinion on the compensation issue for attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants is State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith. 84 The
opinion arose from mandamus action brought by the State Attorney General
against two judges who, contrary to statute, had established county rules regarding
indigent defense services. 85
In addition to statutory provisions providing for the appointment of counsel
in indigent cases (Indigent Defense Services Act of 1986), the State Board of
Indigents' Defense Services in Kansas promulgates rules and regulations regarding
the representation of indigent defendants. These rules and regulations are codified
into statutory law. 86 Compensation is allowed at the rate of $30 per hour, with
maximums set for certain classes of cases and a maximum of $1,000 in felony
cases. 87 Provision is made for awarding of fees in excess of the maximum "only
in exceptional cases."' 88 The statute then proceeds to define "exceptional
cases." 89 Additionally, the statutory law provides for the reimbursement of expenses which were "reasonably incurred" during the appointment. 90
81. Id. at 442.
82. Id. at 443.
83. Id.
84. 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987).
85. Id. at 337-38, 747 P.2d at 816, 822.
86. Id. at 340-41, 747 P.2d at 822. For entire statutory language, see 747 P.2d at 823-28.
87. Id. at 345-46, 747 P.2d at 826-27.
88. Id. at 346, 747 P.2d at 827.
89. Id. An exceptional case is defined as:
(I)(A) Any case involving a Class A or Class B felony charge; or
(B) any case tried on a not guilty plea in which there have been 25 or more hours
spent in court
in defense of the indigent defendant; or
(C) any case not submitted to a judge or jury in which there have been ten hours
or more of in-court time spent in defense of the indigent defendant; and
(2) any such case which has been declared an exceptional case by the court due to its
complexity or other significant characteristics. Such finding by the court is subject
to final approval by the board.
90. Id.
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On March 5, 1987, Judge Smith of Anderson County, Kansas, entered an
order giving effect to his own rules regarding indigent defense services for Anderson County. 91 This order established a panel of attorneys, named by Judge
Smith, from which appointments were to be drawn. 92 The order also provided
that, unless reasonable compensation was provided, no attorney could be compelled to take an appointment to represent an indigent defendant. 93 Reasonable
compensation was set at "$68 or more per hour

. . .

as is required for effective

representation." 9 Additionally, if this reasonable compensation was not available
within 30 days after the declaration of indigency so that the defendant might
have effective assistance of counsel, all charges against the defendant were to
be dismissed without prejudice. 15
With the exception of the number of attorneys assigned to the panel, the order of Judge Smith was adopted in toto on March 6, 1987, by Judge Fromme
in Coffey County, Kansas. 96
The State Attorney General brought a mandamus action against these judges
asking that they be required to comply with the statutes regarding appointments
and compensation for attorneys in indigent cases. 91 In a lengthy, well-reasoned
opinion by Justice Miller of the Supreme Court of Kansas, discussed in depth
below, the statutory system of indigent appointments and compensation was
held unconstitutional, the orders of Judges Smith and Fromme were set aside,
and mandamus was denied. 98
The court initially found that mandamus was the proper procedure to present
the issues. 99 Justice Miller next addressed the issue of the state's obligation
to provide counsel to indigent defendants. The court held that, pursuant to Gideon
v. Wainwright, 100 the state does have such an obligation.

101

The next issue discussed was the duty of judges to appoint counsel in indigent cases. In concluding that judges do have a duty to appoint, Justice Miller
said that "while the selection of counsel" in indigent cases "is discretionary,
the appointment of counsel is nondiscretionary." "2
Concurrent with the question of the duty of the judge to appoint is the question of the duty of the attorney to accept an appointment. Based on Rule 6.1
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 339-40, 747 P.2d at 822.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.The panel of Coffey County consisted of five (5) attorneys.
Id.
242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987).
Id. at 349, 747 P.2d at 828-29.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
242 Kan. at 349, 747 P.2d at 829-32.
Id. at 353, 747 P.2d at 832.
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of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 103 Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 104 and the statutory law of Kansas, 105 the state argued
that attorneys have a duty to represent indigents "for little or no compensation." 10 6 The respondents countered that the Canon and Model Rules regarding representation are not mandatory and, therefore, do "not require attorneys
in private practice to represent indigent defendants for less than a reasonable
fee." 107
Following a summary of the history of attorney duty in indigent appointments,
the court held that the duty of attorneys, at least those attorneys who were members of panels from which appointments were to be made, was clear and found
in the Kansas statutes. 108 As for those attorneys not on panels, the duty was
more troublesome. Justice Miller articulated the problem:
Attorneys generally have an ethical obligation to provide pro bono services for
indigents. Such services may only be provided by attorneys. The individual attorney has a right to make a living. Indigent defendants, on the other hand, have
the right to effective assistance of counsel. The obligation to provide counsel
for indigent defendants is that of the State, not of the individual attorney. The
adjustment of these rights and obligations presents the primary difficulty of the
present statutory system. The burden must be shared equally by those similarly
situated. In the final analysis, it is a matter of reasonableness. 109
The next issue discussed was the duty, if any, of the state to compensate appointed counsel. The state clearly articulated and argued its position: it is the
duty of attorneys to provide representation for little or no compensation and,
therefore, the state "has no obligation to pay for such representation." 110 This
position was rejected by the court. Relying on the New York case of Menin
v. Menin 111 that says "[n]owhere in the right-to-counsel cases does the Supreme
Court state that counsel must be assigned to serve without compensation," 112 the
court held that the State was obligated "to compensate attorneys appointed to
represent indigent defendants."

113

103. Rule 6.1 reads in part: "A lawyer should render public interest legal service." See also Pro Bono
Publico, 73 A.B.A.J. 55-73 (1987); Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV.
735 (1980).
104. 242 Kan. at 356, 747 P.2d at 833.
105. Id. Kansas Statute 22-4501(b) reads, in part: "Each member of the panel for indigents' defense services shall be available to represent indigent defendants upon the appointment of any judge of the district
court of the judicial district in which such member maintains an office for the practice of law, or any adjacent judicial district." Id.
Kansas Statute 22-4503(d) reads, in part: "It is the duty of an attorney appointed by the court to represent
Id. at 342, 747 P.2d at 824.
a defendant, without charge to such defendant .
106. Id. at 356, 747 P.2d at 833.
107. Id. at 357, 747 P.2d at 834.
108. Id. at 359, 747 P.2d at 835. See supra note 105.
109. Id. at 359-60, 747 P.2d at 835-36.
110. Id. at 360, 747 P.2d at 836.
111. 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
112. Id. at 288, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
113. 242 Kan. at 361, 747 P.2d at 836.

ATTORNEY FEE CAPS IN INDIGENT CASES

1989]

Having held that the State has an obligation to provide indigent defendants
with counsel and to compensate appointed counsel, that judges have a duty to
appoint counsel, and that certain counsel have a duty to serve, the next step
was an examination of the system designed to apply these findings. Specifically, did the system of appointing and compensating attorneys for indigent criminal defendants violate the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution 1" The answer in Kansas is "yes.""1 '
Applying the due process test of "whether the legislation has a real and substantial relation to the objective sought, whether it is reasonable in relation to
the subject, and whether it was adopted in the interest of the community," 116 the
court held that "[riequiring attorneys to donate a reasonable amount of time
to indigent defense work bears a real and substantial relation to the legitimate
government objective sought-protection of indigent defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 117 Based on this test, the court held that on its face,
the statute did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 118
The court, however, found the takings clause issue of the fifth amendment
troublesome: "If the property at issue is services, then it is not tangible property
and is not protected by the clause. On the other hand, if the property taken
is viewed as the attorney's money, it is tangible property and may be protected
by the clause." 119 In a lengthy look at how other states had addressed this issue, the court found a trend: "[T]he duty to provide free legal services ... no
longer exists in modern America."120

Based on this trend, the court reasoned that "it is the professional knowledge
which goes into the practice of the profession which is valuable." 121 Finding
professional knowledge to be the essence of the practice of law, the court held
that attorney services are property within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Additionally, the court held that "when attorneys are required to donate
funds out-of-pocket to subsidize a defense for an indigent defendant, the attorneys are deprived of property in the form of money." 22 In Kansas, then, the
fifth amendment is violated whenever an attorney is not fully reimbursed for
his expenses or "when an attorney is required to spend an unreasonable amount
of time on indigent appointments so that there is genuine and substantial interference with his or her private practice." 123
The Kansas appointment and compensation system allowed reimbursement
only for certain "reasonably incurred" expenses. The fees established were sub114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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ject to being reduced. 124 For this reason the court found the system unconstitutional as a violation of the fifth amendment.
The court found that the statutory scheme of compensation did not violate
the separation of power doctrine. The respondents had argued that the executive branch of government was compelling judges to require attorneys to accept appointments, thus acting as an infringement on the judicial authority of
the court to regulate the practice of law. Additionally, respondents had argued
that the determination of reasonable fees was exclusively within the province
of the courts. 125 The court rejected these arguments because the system in Kansas
was "quite flexible": the executive branch estimated need and presented a budget
to the legislature for the appropriation of funds, the Board of Indigents' Defense
Services established an hourly rate, and the judges ultimately determined the
amount of fees to be awarded in any case. 126
The court held that application of the Kansas system violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because Kansas had "imposed
a classification which affect[ed] two or more similarly situated groups in an
unequal manner." 127 Basically, there were different burdens placed on attorneys based on where they practiced: most judicial districts made participation
in appointments for indigents voluntary; others required participation on an appointments panel. There were exceptions to the appointment requirements,
resulting in "about 65 % of the attorneys in private practice . . . not being subject to appointment." 128 This placed a greater burden on attorneys in sparsely
populated areas. The court found no rational basis for this distinction and held
that the system, as administered, violated equal protection. 129
Finally, the respondents argued that the system of indigent appointments violated the thirteenth amendment and resulted in involuntary servitude. 130 Finding
that no attorney had ever been placed in jail for not accepting an appointment,
this argument was rejected. 131
In conclusion, the court found that compensation for appointed counsel was
to be calculated "not at the top rate an attorney might charge, but at a rate which
is not confiscatory, considering overhead and expenses" and that such rate must
be based on a "statewide basis or scale," thereby eliminating any variations from
judge to judge. 132 Additionally, the court held that all out-of-pocket expenses
were to be fully reimbursed. 133
124. Id. at 370, 747 P.2d at 837.
125. Id. at 371-73, 747 P.2d at 842-43.
126. Id. at 373, 747 P.2d at 843.
127. Id. at 375, 747 P.2d at 845.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The statutory scheme of appointment and compensation was found to violate the Kansas Constitution
but is not discussed herein. For a review of that discussion, see id. at 378, 747 P.2d at 847-49.
131. Id. at 378, 747 P.2d at 846-47.
132. Id. at 383, 747 P.2d at 849.
133. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Mississippi Supreme Court is faced with three choices in deciding the
Pruett case: holding Section 99-15-17 unconstitutional on its face and awarding appropriate attorney fees; holding Section 99-15-17 constitutional and denying the fees requested; or holding Section 99-15-17 constitutional on its face
but unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, and awarding appropriate attorney fees.
To hold Section 99-15-17 unconstitutional on its face and award appropriate
attorney fees would create unnecessary unrest within the judicial system; there
would be no constitutional guidelines for judges to follow in awarding attorney
fees in appointed cases. As a practical matter, the courts would probably follow the current statutory scheme, making adjustments where deemed appropriate,
until the legislature formulated a new, constitutionally acceptable method for
determining compensation. As will be seen, however, Section 99-15-17 is constitutional on its face. Therefore, such a holding would be in error.
The court could by-pass the issue altogether by holding Section 99-15-17 constitutional and denying the fees requested. In doing so, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court would be passing up an opportunity to align itself with
the jurisdictions discussed above on the cutting edge of this new development
in criminal law. Additionally, such a ruling would, in all likelihood, result in
additional appeals by Bright and Singleton.
The logical choice, then, is to hold Section 99-15-17 constitutional on its face,
but unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. This ruling would allow the court to fashion a new system for compensation of attorneys in exceptional cases without the necessity of legislative mandate.
Counsel for Pruett have presented their case before the Mississippi Supreme
Court on the grounds of a taking of services without due process of law, equal
protection, and the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. 134 The
due process argument lends itself more readily to the outcome presented in this
analysis. Additionally, should the court decide the issue presented on this ground,
there would be no necessity to consider the other grounds. For these reasons,
the due process challenge will be the only ground discussed.
Due process has been described as "an elusive concept" with undefined boundaries. 135 However, "[t]he essence of due process is protection against arbitrary
government action." 136 The due process test "is whether the legislation has a
real and substantial relation to the objective sought, whether it is reasonable
in relation to the subject, and whether it was adopted in the interest of the com-

munity."

137

134. Motion, supra note 6, at 1I.
135. Smith v. Miller, 213 Kan. 1, 7, 514 P.2d 377, 383 (1973) (quoting Hanna v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 442 (1960)).
136. 242 Kan. 336, 362, 747 P.2d 816, 837 (1987).
137. Id.
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The Mississippi Legislature responded to Gideon by passing Section 99-15-15,
Appointment of Counsel for Indigents. The matter of compensation for appointed
counsel was provided by the passage of Section 99-15-17, Compensation of
Counsel-Amount. The objective sought by the passage of this legislation was
the protection of sixth amendment rights of indigent defendants. To ensure that
indigent defendants have counsel, it was reasonable for the legislature to provide for payment to such counsel. The interest of the community is served when
the judicial system functions in an orderly fashion and in compliance with federal mandates. The adoption of Section 99-15-15 brought Mississippi into compliance with Gideon; Section 99-15-17 ensured that the system of appointments
would be effective. The due process test had been met.
In Mississippi "[t]he matter of compensation of an attorney appointed to
represent an indigent defendant is a matter that rests solely with the legislature
as a legislative function." 138 Clearly, then, the adoption of Section 99-15-17
was within the legislative authority and power "to appropriate funds for public
purposes and resolve questions of compensation." '39 From the standpoint of
due process, then, Section 99-15-17 is constitutional.
A taking occurs when private property is appropriated for public purpose
without providing just compensation. 110 Under the analysis required to determine whether property has been taken, the Mississippi Supreme Court must
consider its position regarding attorney services as property.
Mississippi is one of the states holding "that requiring counsel to serve without
compensation is not an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation." 11 Mississippi's position is clear: "the representation of indigents .. .is a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice . ..and
attorneys can be required to make a reasonable contribution of their time and
services as an aid to the effective administration of justice." 142 In this respect
Mississippi is currently in the same position as Alaska before DeLisio. With
Pruett, the Mississippi Supreme Court has the opportunity to reevaluate its position and join the states of Alaska, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Florida in
formulating and solidifying a new trend.
What, then, are attorney services? Attorney services consist of, in part, professional knowledge consisting of time, advice, and counsel; "learned and reflective thought, .. .recommendations, suggestions, directions, plans, diagnoses,
and advice ..... 143 These are intangible items, but it is through these intan138. Young v. State, 255 So. 2d 318, 322 (Miss. 1971).
139. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986). See also Young v. State, 255
So. 2d 318 (Miss. 1971).
140. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See also State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 367, 747 P.2d 816,
837 (1987).
141. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1121, 1141 (8th Cir. 1982). See also supra note 67.
142. 255 So. 2d at 321.
143. 242 Kan. at 369, 747 P.2d at 841.
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bles that an attorney earns a living. When these services "are conscripted for
the public good, such a taking is akin to the taking of food or clothing from
a merchant or the taking of services from any other professional for the public
good." 144
Attorneys, along with other professionals, must be licensed by the state in
order to practice their skills. "One who practices his profession has a property
interest in that pursuit which may not be taken from him or her at the whim
of the government without due process." 145 Moreover,
a state cannot impose restrictions on the acceptance of the license which will
deprive the licensee of his constitutional rights. If states have the power to impose the duty to render gratuitous services on the license of an attorney, that power
must be based on more than the mere right of the state to license. 146
Attorneys have the same right as everyone else to earn a living. Mississippi,
however, bases its position of gratuitous legal services on the "mere right of
the state to license." 147
The issue of licensing becomes irrelevant when based on the theory that it
is not the practice of law which is at issue, but rather the labor of the attorney. 141 Labor has long been recognized as property; attorney services and work
are labor; therefore, under this analysis, attorney services are considered
"property" within the constitutional realm. 149
The historical tradition of providing free services as a condition of licensing
and the practice of law is falling in the face of constitutional challenges. "[T]radition alone, regardless of its venerability, cannot validate an otherwise unconstitutional practice." 150 It is insufficient to uphold a practice simply on the basis
that "it has always been done that way." In effect, this is exactly the current
position of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
Based on the reasons articulated in the above analysis, the Mississippi Supreme
Court should hold that attorney services are "property" within the meaning of
the fifth amendment. Once it has been established that attorney services are
property, the question becomes: has there been a taking of that property without
just compensation?
Bright and Singleton were appointed to represent Marion Albert Pruett. Their
services were conscripted for the benefit of the State of Mississippi. The answer to whether there was a taking is clearly "yes." To fully answer the question, however, "just compensation" must be defined.
The law in Mississippi regarding compensation for appointed counsel seems
144. Id. at 370, 747 P.2d at 842.
145. Id. at 370, 747 P.2d at 841. See also 740 P.2d at 440.
146. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133 P.2d 325, 327 (1943).
147. Id.
148. 740 P.2d at 440.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 441. For a complete analysis of the historical background of uncompensated appointment of
counsel, see State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 759-69 (Mo. 1985). For an analysis of the current trend in this area, see State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987).
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to hold that legislatively proscribed limits on attorney compensation are controlling and cannot be modified. This view is reflected in the fact that the trial
court, apparently thinking that Section 99-15-17 is mandatory and inflexible,
was unwilling to exceed the statutory maximum attorney fee of $1,000.
A finding that the statute is inflexible would reduce appointed counsels' fees
in Pruett to nothing more than "token compensation." 1 51 But is "token compensation" which results in an hourly rate far below minimum wage "just compensation" within constitutional meaning? The answer is "no." "Token
compensation" is that "which is confiscatory" of an attorney's "time, energy and
talents." 15 2 Providing services to the public for less than minimum wage is confiscatory, not "just" within constitutional interpretation, and therefore constitutes a taking.
The analysis to this point shows that the State of Mississippi has taken the
services of Bright and Singleton without just compensation in violation of the
fifth amendment. Assuming the Mississippi Supreme Court follows this analysis in reaching its decision, the next logical question is how to resolve the situation. The obvious answer is for the court to award compensation that is just. In
determining what compensation would be "just" in the Pruett case, the Mississippi Supreme Court would be wise to look to some of the other jurisdictions
that have dealt with similar issues.
Just compensation has been approached and defined by several
methods. Alaska measures just compensation "by the fair market value of the
property appropriated, or the 'price in money that the property could be sold
for on the open market under fair conditions between an owner willing to sell
and a purchaser willing to buy with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser."' 153 Fair market value reflects only "the compensation received by the
average competent attorney operating on the open market" and not an attorney's "normal rate of compensation." 1 Nevada, Oregon, and Arkansas hold
that legislatively proscribed limits control and cannot be abandoned. 155 West
Virginia allows exceptions to the legislatively mandated compensation scheme
under extraordinary conditions found by the judge, 156 as does Illinois, 157 New
Hampshire, 158 Georgia, 159 and Florida. 160 Nebraska, a state with no statutory scheme, defines just compensation as "reasonable compensa-

151. 491 So. 2d at1113.
152. Id.at 1115.
153. 740 P.2d at 443.
154. Id.
155. Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev. 582, 555 P.2d 490 (1976); Keene v. Jackson County, 3 Or. App. 551,
474 P.2d 777 (1970); State v. Ruiz & Van Denton, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980).
156. State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976).
157. People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Il.2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966).
158. State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 465 A.2d 1214 (1988).
159. In re Whatley, 256 Ga. 289, 347 S.E.2d 602 (1986).
160. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1986).

19891

ATTORNEY FEE CAPS IN INDIGENT CASES

Missouri holds that "fair compensation" is the guide. 162
For the purpose of deciding the Pruett appeal, the court should award attorneys' fees in such an amount as would reflect "reasonable compensation" for
the services provided. This rate may be calculated based on the average hourly rate for similar services in Mississippi. If the Mississippi Supreme Court
is reluctant to make such a valuation, the court should remand the case to the
trial court and allow the trial court to assess "reasonable compensation." The
Mississippi Supreme Court should also consider the adoption of a permanent
method for the valuation of attorneys' fees in appointed cases in an effort to
prevent this type of challenge in the future. At the very least, the court should
formulate a plan and request the legislature to codify the plan.
The easiest method to implement and follow, and the method that Mississippi should adopt, is that which allows a judge to deviate from legislativelymandated attorneys' fees when there is a finding of extraordinary circumstances. "Extraordinary circumstances" can be readily determined. If an appointment deprives an attorney of an inordinate amount of time away from his
or her practice; involves traveling of great distances; involves certain felonies,
including death penalty cases; or other such undue burdens or hardships, extraordinary circumstances may be found. A finding of "extraordinary circumstances" should be fully articulated on the record and in any order awarding
compensation to ensure proper consideration if the matter is appealed.
This method could be adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court simply by
pointing to the language of Section 99-15-17 and applying the "plain meaning"
rule. Section 99-15-17 provides that appointed counsel seeking compensation
shall present the appropriate judge with an itemized statement of expenses and
time spent on the appointed case. This provision is mandatory for every appointment. Since judges are currently reviewing requests for attorney fees in
appointed cases, no additional provision would be necessary to provide this aspect
of individual review at the trial level.
A plain reading of the statute shows that compensation, in accordance with
the itemized statement, shall be approved and allowed by the appropriate
judge. This provision is clearly mandatory for judges; all fees must be judicially approved before being submitted for payment. Once approved, the fees
shall be allowed. The language establishing the maximum fees, however, says
"may not exceed," clearly a discretionary term. Since discretion may be found
in the language of the statute, language which the legislature chose, the implication that judges may exceed the statutory limits on a finding of extraordinary
circumstances is a logical conclusion which would not violate the substance of
the statute itself. Additional support for this argument can be articulated in a
finding that courts have a duty to appoint counsel; they also have a duty to
tion."
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161. Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d 761 (1975).
162. State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981).
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allow compensation for such appointments. The authority to allow "just compensation" to ensure effective assistance of counsel is "absolutely essential to
the performance" of a court's judicial function. 163
No doubt the court will be concerned that the above interpretation of the statute seems to stretch the language to fit a particular ruling. If concerned that
such an interpretation would violate the intended purpose of the statute, the court
can direct the legislature to amend Section 99-15-17. The amendments would
be minor. The insertion of one sentence prior to the sentence mandating reimbursement of actual expenses would be sufficient. By way of illustration, such
an insertion would change the language of Section 99-15-17 in the following
manner:
The compensation for counsel for indigents .

. .

. If the case is appealed to

the State Supreme Court by counsel appointed by the judge, the allowable fee
; provided, however, comfor services on appeal shall not exceed
pensationfor appointed counsel in excess of the maximums stated above shall
be approved only in exceptional cases. A detailedfinding of the exceptional circumstances shall be made on the record and in the order allowing attorneyfees.

Such an amendment would inject flexibility into the statute.
Further, since the Mississippi Supreme Court has said that the legislature is
the appropriate forum to provide compensation in appointed cases, it would
be necessary for the legislature to reconsider and amend the valuation of just
compensation. The most effective method for this valuation would be a set hourly
rate for attorney services with maximums established within statistical averages for each class of case for which a maximum fee is statutorily provided. This
method of valuation could carry an added benefit to the taxpayer and the judicial system as a whole by actually saving on attorneys' fees currently being expended. This benefit would come from allowing attorneys to be compensated
on an hourly rate only for the hours actually expended on a case, rather than
receiving the maximum for each appointment regardless of time spent. Additionally, by establishing an hourly rate for attorney services, fees across the
state would be the same, thereby eliminating the possibility of different rates
for different jurisdictions. Another benefit to be derived from the adoption of
such a method of valuation would be the flexibility and ease of future amendments to ensure that attorney fees do not become confiscatory in the future.
The actual amendment required to enact the hourly rate provision would be
fairly simple. By way of illustration, inserting the words "at the hourly rate
, but" in the first sentence of Section 99-15-17 would change the staof__
tute in the following way:
The compensation for counsel for indigents appointed as provided in Section
99-15-15, shall be approved and allowed by the appropriate judge at the hourly
163. 491 So. 2d at 1113.
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rate of

-,

but in any one (1) case, may not exceed

-

for representa-

tion in circuit court whether on appeal or originating in said court.
As previously stated, the legislature should provide the appropriate hourly
rate and maximums. Further amendments could be expeditiously handled by
simply changing the hourly rate and maximums when necessary. Using this
method of amendment would eliminate the need to rewrite the statute in the future.
Should the above amendment be adopted or should the Mississippi Supreme
Court adopt the ideas presented in this comment, the issue of funding would
be raised. Where will the funds come from to support attorney fees in excess
of the maximums currently allowed by the statute? Funding is a matter for the
legislature, not the judiciary. This is a matter beyond the scope of this comment. For that reason, the issue of funding will be left solely to the discretion
of the legislature and will not be addressed here.
Does a taking occur when expenses are not reimbursed? A plain reading of
the statute clearly shows that the answer is "yes." The specific language of Section 99-15-17 is mandatory: "[T]he judge shall allow reimbursement of actual
expenses." There is "no requirement of either law or professional ethics which
requires attorneys to advance personal funds in substantial amounts for the payment of either costs or expenses of the preparation of a proper defense of the
indigent accused." 164
The issue of reimbursement of expended funds to an attorney in a court appointed case should not be confused with the issue of a request for funds with
which to hire an expert. In the latter instance, unlike the Pruett case, no personal funds of the attorney have been expended. 165 The facts in Pruett are
clear: reimbursement of funds expended by counsel to employ an expert was
denied. 166 This denial was unconstitutional and the Mississippi Supreme Court
should so hold.
V. CONCLUSION

The attorneys for Marion Albert Pruett have presented the Mississippi Supreme
Court with an issue which is on the cutting edge of criminal law: the constitutionality of attorney fee caps in indigent cases. The Mississippi Supreme Court
should resolve this issue in a way that will benefit the entire criminal justice
system in Mississippi. Such a solution has been presented in this comment.
Tracy L. Morris
164. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982)(quoting State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Mo. 1981)). See also State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816
(1987); State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 465 A.2d 1214 (1983); Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); People v. Randolph, 35 II1. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966).
165. See, e.g., Pinkney v. State, 538 So. 2d 329, 343-44 (Miss. 1988) and cases cited therein.
166. Motion, supra note 6, at 6.

